报告题目：Player labels in tacit bargaining games—an experimental study

报 告 人：Jiwei Zheng

时 间：2024年7月23日9:00-11:00

地 点：创新港涵英楼8121会议室

报告人简介：

Jiwei Zheng, from Dalian, Liaoning, holds a Ph.D. in Behavioral Economics from the University of East Anglia, UK. He has completed postdoctoral research at Warwick Business School and the University of Leeds in the UK. He is now a tenured associate professor and Ph.D. supervisor at Lancaster University Management School, where he also serves as the Director of External Relations for the Economics Department. His research has been published in top international journals such as the Journal of Political Economy, Management Science, Games and Economic Behavior, and the European Economic Review. In 2020, he received the Lancaster University Management School Award for Excellence in Teaching. He also serves as a peer reviewer for several internationally well-regarded journals.

摘要：

Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling proposed that bargainers can use their shared knowledge of theoretically irrelevant aspects of the situation to concert their expectations on one of the agreements, which becomes the‘focal point’of that situation. In this study, we report an experiment exploring how player labels - that is, irrelevant but commonly-known characteristics of the bargainers themselves - affect their behaviour in tacit bargaining games. We find that when players are labelled as‘male’and‘female’, those with the female label play more hawkishly than those with the male label. Similarly, when players are labelled as‘king’and‘duke’, the‘king’plays more hawkishly than the‘duke’. We conclude that player labels, as strategy labels, can significantly change behaviour in tacit bargaining games, and they should be taken into consideration when analysing individuals’behaviour in tacit bargaining situations.

经济与金融学院

2024年7月16日